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A. Introduction
Spurred at least in part by the revenue crunch
precipitated by the financial crisis, the United States
has taken an aggressive stance towards non-
reporting of offshore income and attendant offshore
tax evasion. Our contribution discusses administra-
tive and legal mechanisms, especially the Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act, that the United States
has deployed to obtain offshore tax information. As
this article reveals, while FATCA has been widely
criticized as unilateral and extraterritorial legisla-
tion, it has also bolstered the offshore tax compli-
ance efforts of governments other than the United
States. For many jurisdictions, FATCA thus offers an
aspirational new global standard for automatic ex-
change of information — one that would supple-
ment, if not replace, information exchange on
request.
B. The Rise of FATCA
Every year, the United States loses at least $100
billion in tax revenue as a result of tax evasion using
offshore bank accounts.1 Offshore evasion strategies
have ranged from diversion of earnings from U.S.
sources into offshore trusts and other entities2 to the
conversion of cash holdings by individuals into
diamonds, which were then smuggled out of the
United States in a tube of toothpaste before being
secreted in Swiss bank vaults.3 Historically, these
evasion strategies have been effective because of
other jurisdictions’ strong bank secrecy rules.4 To
overcome lack of cooperation from other jurisdic-
tions, the United States has undertaken a series of
aggressive tax enforcement approaches, culminat-
ing in the adoption of FATCA in 2010.5
1. Background. Starting in 2001, foreign financial
institutions could enter into qualified intermediary
agreements with the United States.6 FFIs that be-
came QIs agreed to determine the identity of their
clients, but they did not have to report the identities
of non-U.S. clients, including corporations, to the
IRS as long as QIs concluded that the proper
amount of U.S. tax was withheld on U.S.-source
payments to the non-U.S. clients.7
The highly publicized whistleblower case of
Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS banker,8 and the
IRS’s related John Doe summonses9 revealed that
UBS encouraged U.S. taxpayers to form foreign
shell corporations that would open offshore ac-
counts at UBS. UBS then took the position that no
withholding was required regarding the payments
to the foreign shells, even though its bankers knew
1Staff of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 110th Cong., ‘‘Tax
Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance,’’ at 3 (2008).
2For discussion, see Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions, 108th Cong., ‘‘Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers, the Tools
and Secrecy,’’ at 1 (2006).
3See Mark Hosenball and Evan Thomas, ‘‘Cracking the
Vault,’’ Newsweek, Mar. 23, 2009, at 32.
4See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, ‘‘Don’t Tread on Me: Has the
United States Government’s Quest for Customer Records From
UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?’’ 30
Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1 (2010) (describing Swiss bank secrecy
rules).
5See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L.
111-147, section 501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
6See reg. section 1.1441-1.
7Id.
8See ‘‘Year in Review: The 2009 Person of the Year,’’ Tax Notes,
Jan. 4, 2010, p. 7 (describing Birkenfeld’s actions).
9See supra note 1.
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that the beneficial owners were U.S. residents.10
Under a deferred prosecution agreement with the
United States, UBS agreed to pay a fine of $780
million, release (through the Swiss government) the
names of 250 U.S. holders of offshore UBS accounts,
and cease its illegal banking and brokerage activi-
ties in the United States. Under a separate agree-
ment, UBS ultimately agreed to disclose the names
of 4,500 of an estimated 20,000 U.S. holders of
offshore accounts at UBS.
There is little reason to think that abuses of the QI
regime were limited to UBS. The magnitude of
offshore evasion became even more apparent when,
contemporaneously with its actions against UBS
and other financial institutions, the government
announced in 2009 an offshore voluntary compli-
ance initiative, under which nearly 15,000 U.S.
taxpayers disclosed to the IRS that they held funds
in previously unreported offshore accounts.11
2. FATCA. In response to the weaknesses of the QI
regime and the increased attention on the offshore
evasion epidemic following the UBS deferred pros-
ecution agreement, Congress enacted FATCA in
2010.12 Under FATCA, participating FFIs are re-
quired to report the name, address, and other
identifying information for each account holder that
is a U.S. person, the account number and balance,
and any gross dividends, interest, and other income
paid to the account. Participating FFIs must also
obtain various documents from any account hold-
ers that possess indicia of U.S. status. Participating
FFIs are required to withhold 30 percent on some
payments to recalcitrant account holders and other
financial institutions that do not comply with
FATCA.
FATCA’s enforcement mechanism is both potent
and innovative. FFIs refusing to cooperate with the
regime by reporting the required information are
subject to a 30 percent withholding tax on certain
U.S.-source payments, including U.S.-source inter-
est and dividends, and gross proceeds from the sale
of assets that generate U.S. dividends and interest.13
To avoid being subject to this withholding tax, FFIs
must register with the IRS and commit to report
information regarding their U.S. account holders
and non-U.S. account holders that are entities with
substantial U.S. owners.14
3. Criticism. Commentators have characterized
FATCA as ‘‘aggressive,’’15 ‘‘audacious,’’16 ‘‘egre-
gious,’’17 ‘‘draconian,’’18 and ‘‘devastatingly de-
structive.’’19 The principal criticisms have been that
FATCA is not only unilateral,20 but also extraterri-
torial.21 Critics contend that FATCA requires finan-
cial institutions in jurisdictions outside the United
States to act like ‘‘U.S. Treasury watchdogs’’22 and
that it ‘‘strong arms every financial institution in the
world into doing the job of the IRS.’’23 According to
representatives of large financial institutions and
other businesses outside the United States, the
legislation will result in billions of dollars in imple-
mentation costs.24 Some government officials out-
side of the United States assert that despite the
attempt by the United States to enter into intergov-
ernmental agreements, FATCA conflicts with the
local banking and privacy laws of many other
jurisdictions.25 Further, critics contend that the
10See, e.g., UBS Deferred Prosecution Agreement, at 2. See also
id. at Exhibit C, at 4-5.
11See IR-2011-55, at 97-11.
12See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, P.L.
111-147, section 501, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).
13See sections 1471(a) and 1473(1).
14See section 1471(c).
15Scott D. Michel, ‘‘FATCA: A New Era of Financial Trans-
parency,’’ J. of Acc., Jan. 2013.
16Susan C. Morse, ‘‘Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of
Global Tax Reporting,’’ 57 Vill. L. Rev. 529, 536 (2012).
17Don Whiteley, ‘‘IRS Wants Canada to Nab U.S. Tax Cheats:





19Andrew F. Quinlan, ‘‘FATCA and US Fiscal Imperialism
Threaten to Sink Global Economy,’’ The Daily Caller, Mar. 19,
2013, available at http://dailycaller.com/2013/03/19/fatca-and-
us-fiscal-imperialism-threaten-to-sink-global-economy/.
20See, e.g., EU Parliament FATCA Hearing, May 28, 2013
(statement of Marie Rosvall, president of the Fiscal Committee,
European Banking Federation), available at http://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0, at 22:44 (‘‘How can one
country impose its law on other countries without any consul-
tations or discussions?’’).
21Canadian Finance Minister James M. Flaherty described
FATCA’s ‘‘far-reaching extraterritorial implications’’ that would
‘‘turn Canadian banks into extensions of the IRS.’’ Letter from
Flaherty to The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The
Wall Street Journal (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://busin
ess.financialpost.com/2011/09/16/read-jim-flahertys-letter-on-
americans-in-canada. See also Arthur J. Cockfield, ‘‘The Limits of
the International Tax Regime as a Commitment Projector,’’ 33
Va. Tax Rev. 59 (2013), at 102-103 (‘‘the unilateral nature of
FATCA arguably subverts traditional multilateral processes’’).
See also Allison Christians, ‘‘Putting the Reign Back in Sover-
eign,’’ 40 Pepp. L. Rev. 1373, 1408 (FATCA ‘‘proposes a turn away
from multilateralism’’).
22Christopher Elias, ‘‘U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance
Act Threatens Investment in the U.S.,’’ Reuters, Jan. 25, 2012.
23Quinlan, supra note 19.
24See Kate Burgess, ‘‘U.S. Legislation: Industry Concerned at
Extraterritorial Tax Clampdown Plan,’’ Financial Times, May 8,
2012.
25Patricia Lee, ‘‘U.S. Extra-Territorial Approach to Regula-
tions Could Have Unintended Consequences for Asia-Pacific
Region,’’ Reuters, Sept. 4, 2012.
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United States acts like the ‘‘loan sheriff in town’’26
by demanding information from other jurisdictions
without offering any information in exchange. In
light of this criticism and the legal obstacles of local
bank secrecy rules, several commentators have even
predicted that the FATCA regime will not survive.27
C. From Unilateralism to Multilateralism
While complaints about the unilateralism and
extraterritoriality of FATCA are not without merit,
FATCA has enhanced multilateral cooperation in
combating tax evasion, and it has spawned similar
legislation and treaties in other jurisdictions.
1. Model IGAs. The largest EU countries — France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom —
as well as the European Commission worked with
the United States to develop the text of the Model 1
IGA. Along with the Model 2 agreement, these
IGAs seek to both reduce compliance burdens for
FFIs and avoid conflicts between FFIs’ obligations
under FATCA and their client-confidentiality obli-
gations under foreign law. For example, FFIs lo-
cated in Model 1 partner jurisdictions need not
enter into separate FFI agreements with the United
States in order to avoid the withholding tax.28
Importantly, the Model 1 IGA developed with the
G-5 and the commission contemplates reciprocal
automatic exchange of information from U.S. finan-
cial institutions. The United States entered into the
first Model 1 IGA with the United Kingdom, and
several more have followed. The United States is
actively engaged in talks with 70 jurisdictions re-
garding FATCA.29
2. Son of FATCA. Perhaps more remarkable has
been the adoption of FATCA-like legislation or
treaties by other jurisdictions. For example, the
United Kingdom has drafted ‘‘son of FATCA’’ leg-
islation aimed at securing information from its
crown dependencies and overseas territories.30 The
United Kingdom has entered into information shar-
ing agreements with its crown dependencies mod-
eled on the U.K.-U.S. bilateral IGA.31 Notably, to
minimize additional compliance burdens for finan-
cial institutions, the United Kingdom has incorpo-
rated nearly identical reporting requirements as
those required under the U.S. model IGAs, even
going so far as to denominate threshold account
values in U.S. dollars and incorporating by refer-
ence U.S. Treasury regulations.32 An important dif-
ference is that the United Kingdom’s agreements
with its crown dependencies lack the withholding
tax enforcement mechanism of FATCA.
In the same vein, the French ‘‘mini-FATCA’’ aims
at overseas trusts and carries a penalty of the larger
of €10,000 or 5 percent of the corpus for failure to
provide detailed information on the assets of French
residents.33
3. FATCA as new global standard. In addition to
the jurisdictions emulating FATCA, many jurisdic-
tions view FATCA as an opportunity to establish a
global standard for automatic information ex-
change. For example, in discussing its new informa-
tion sharing agreements with its crown
dependencies, the U.K. government stated that:
the U.K. was quick to see the potential . . . to
embed a new international standard in the
exchange of information based around the
FATCA model. This would provide a step
change in the ability of the international com-
munity to tackle tax evasion, while minimiz-
ing costs for governments and business (who
are already investing in the systems and pro-
cesses necessary to comply with the U.S.
26Jeff N. Mukadi, ‘‘FATCA and the Shaping of a New
International Tax Order,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, June 25, 2012, p. 1227.
27See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, ‘‘The (Dwindling) Rights and
Obligations of Citizenship,’’ 21 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 899 (2013)
(‘‘It is not clear that the FATCA regime is sustainable’’); Frederic
Behrens, ‘‘Using a Sledgehammer to Crack a Nut: Why FATCA
Will Not Stand,’’ 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 205.
28Other benefits of the Model 1 IGA for FFIs include reduced
due diligence requirements and exemptions from FATCA re-
porting requirements for more kinds of institutions and prod-
ucts.
29Robert Stack, ‘‘Myth vs. FATCA: The Truth About Trea-
sury’s Effort to Combat Offshore Evasion’’ (Sept. 20, 2013),
available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/
Myth-vs-FATCA.aspx. Under the Model 2 IGA, the FATCA
partner country will authorize its FFIs to report FATCA-
required information directly to the IRS. The United States has
entered into Model 2 IGAs with Bermuda, Japan, and Switzer-
land.
30John McCann and Angela Nightingale, ‘‘Tax Information
Sharing, the Rise of ‘FATCA-esque’ Agreements,’’ Aima, at 2
(Oct. 24, 2013), available at www.aima.org/en/education/aima
journal/q12013/tax-information-sharing.cfm.
31Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey. See, e.g., statement of
Guernsey’s chief minister describing the Guernsey-U.K. agree-
ment as providing for ‘‘enhanced reporting of tax information
along FATCA principles.’’ States of Guernsey, release (May 14,
2013), available at http://www.gov.gg/article/107574/Chief-
Minister-emphasises-Guernseys-support-for-greater-global-tax-
transparency.
32See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Gov-
ernment of Jersey to Improve International Tax Compliance,
Annex I, Art. II (reporting financial institutions may, as an
alternative to the reporting procedures provided in the agree-
ment, apply the reporting procedures described in the ‘‘U.S.
Treasury Regulations’’). Id., at art. 1.1(f), defining U.S. regula-
tions as those ‘‘Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign
Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to
Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities.’’ See
also id. (incorporating amendments to the U.S. regulations, to
the extent agreed by the parties).
33McCann and Nightingale, supra note 30, at 2.
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FATCA legislation and the subsequent inter-
governmental agreements to implement it).
The United Kingdom announced that, in addition to
its crown dependencies, it would seek to negotiate
similar automatic information exchange agreements
with other jurisdictions, and that these contemplated
agreements, along with its own IGA with the United
States, ‘‘all form part of a drive to embed a new single
international standard in the automatic exchange of
tax information.’’ Likewise, in May 2013, 16 EU
member states called for a ‘‘new global standard for
automatic exchange of information to tackle tax eva-
sion, based on the U.S. FATCA legislation.’’ Most
importantly, in early 2014, the OECD announced,34
and the G20 approved,35 a new Common Reporting
and Due Diligence Standard for use by countries
wishing to exchange information automatically. The
OECD describes this standard as drawing ‘‘exten-
sively on the intergovernmental approach to
implementing FATCA . . . with a view maximizing
efficiency and reducing cost for financial institu-
tions.’’36
4. Multilateral information exchange. FATCA also
seems to have precipitated or accelerated efforts at
multilateral information exchange. For example, the
G-5 announced that they will exchange information
multilaterally based on the U.S. model IGA.37 Like-
wise, official statements from the EU cast FATCA as
providing ‘‘a unique opportunity to move from a
series of bilateral agreements to a multilateral sys-
tem.’’38 Indeed, unilateral FATCA ultimately may
help improve the leaky EU savings directive.39
Veto-holding EU member states attempting to pre-
serve what was left of banking secrecy in their
jurisdictions have blocked amendments to the di-
rective.40 Members of the EU Parliament, even
when they vehemently oppose FATCA, seem to
agree that FATCA has galvanized the EU into
action. For example, at a public parliamentary hear-
ing on FATCA, European Parliament member So-
phia in ’t Veld (Netherlands) stated, ‘‘The fact that
we’re welcoming the application of third country
law on our territory is only a reflection of the
weakness of the European Union. We only have
ourselves to blame because we were unable to
adopt our own policies.’’41
If FATCA represents a new global standard for
information exchange, that standardization would
mitigate the concern by banking associations that
they are being asked to shoulder an extraordinary
administrative burden concerning only Americans.
If every country adopted a FATCA-like regime, FFIs
would no longer be looking for American needles in
a global haystack. Standardization according to the
FATCA model would mitigate FFIs’ concerns that
they could be subject to a variety of conflicting
reporting requirements imposed by different states.
Likewise, IGAs and attendant legislative changes in
FATCA partner countries resolve conflicts between
FFIs’ obligations under FATCA and their obliga-
tions under local law. In short, multilateralism and
cooperation may be the key to successful imple-
mentation of what has been criticized as unilateral
and extraterritorial U.S. legislation.
D. Unanswered Questions
Even as IGAs solve conflicts between FATCA and
foreign law, IGAs themselves raise domestic legal
questions. For example, Rep. Bill Posey, R.-Fla., sent
a letter last July to Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew
questioning the legal authority under which the
IGAs are negotiated and asking whether Treasury
expects IGAs to be self-executing.42
In addition to legal questions, IGAs raise political
questions. For example, to the extent that the
34OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial
Account Information: Common Reporting Standard (undated




35See ‘‘EU Tax Commissioner Welcomes Global Tax Transpar-
ency Standard,’’ Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Daily (Feb. 23,
2014).
36OECD, Standard for Automatic Exchange, supra note 34, at
3 (describing the aim of the standard as ‘‘to avoid a proliferation
of different standards which would increase costs for both
governments and financial institutions’’).
37HM Treasury, ‘‘Joint Communique on the ‘Model Intergov-
ernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Compliance and Imple-




38Statement by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Po-
land, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom on the Pilot Multilateral Automatic
Information Exchange Facility, ECOFIN (May 14, 2013), available
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-
on-the-pilot-multilateral-automatic-information-exchange-facili
ty. See also Council of the EU, release, 3238th Council Meeting,
Economic and Financial Affairs, at 12 (May 14, 2013), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pre
ssdata/en/ecofin/137122.pdf.
39Council Directive 2003/48, 2003 O.J. (L 157) 38 on taxation
of savings.
40For the requirement of member state unanimity in tax
matters, see Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 115.
41See EU parliamentary hearing on FATCA, at 38:57, available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zRoU-JNFhr0.
42Letter from Posey to Lew, ‘‘Rep. Posey Calls for FATCA
Enforcement Moratorium’’ (July 1, 2013).
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United States negotiates reciprocal Model 1 IGAs,43
implementing legislation presumably would be re-
quired to impose new reporting requirements on
U.S. financial institutions,44 and those new report-
ing requirements likely would face political resis-
tance from affected parties. If domestic financial
institutions do not already possess account owner-
ship information sufficient to determine their re-
porting obligations under reciprocal IGAs, their
compliance burdens will increase (and, presumably,
so will their political resistance to reciprocity).45 To
take just one example, if domestic financial institu-
tions ultimately will be obliged to apply FATCA’s
passthrough rules for payments to entities, domes-
tic financial institutions will face the problem of
accounts held by Delaware limited liability compa-
nies for which they lack beneficial ownership infor-
mation.46
These are really just the tip of the iceberg; FATCA
raises many additional questions. For example, can
the U.S. standard become a worldwide standard, in
light of competing preexisting automatic informa-
tion exchange obligations, such as the EU savings
directive?47 Are the privacy protections afforded to
account holders adequate under FATCA? To what
extent will developing countries benefit from a new
standard of automatic information exchange, par-
ticularly when those countries lack the administra-
tive apparatus to reciprocate information?48
FATCA already represents a substantial commit-
ment of government resources, both by FATCA
partner jurisdictions and by the United States,
which so far has developed and negotiated 19 IGAs
and written hundreds of pages of guidance.49 Af-
fected financial institutions have shouldered heavy
burdens to implement a reporting regime that is
estimated to raise only $8.7 billion over 10 years.50
Moreover, the complexity and novel legal questions
raised by FATCA, which have necessitated ex-
tended effective dates and the phasing-in of its
provisions over a period of six years, raise questions
about the ultimate fate of the legislation. If political
will for FATCA was founded principally on fiscal
stress, will the United States abandon the regime as
the economy improves?
E. Conclusion
Fiscal crisis emboldened the United States to use
access to its capital markets as an enforcement
mechanism for securing information about domes-
tic taxpayers from foreign institutions. And, in turn,
the U.S. passage of FATCA emboldened some of our
trading partners to rally behind a new standard of
automatic information exchange.51 Thus, the initial
43Model Intergovernmental Agreement to Improve Tax Com-
pliance and to Implement FATCA, art. 6, at 13-14 (describing
U.S. commitments to exchange information on a reciprocal basis
with the FATCA partner).
44See Office of Management and Budget, ‘‘Analytical Per-
spectives: Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2014,’’ at
202 (proposing to request that legislation).
45Under current IGAs, the reciprocal reporting obligations of
the United States are limited to information that U.S. financial
institutions already are required to collect concerning non-U.S.
account holders. See ‘‘Model Intergovernmental Agreement to
Improve Tax Compliance and to Implement FATCA,’’ art.
2(2)(b), at 9. But the Model 1 IGA also includes a statement that
the United States will pursue ‘‘equivalent levels of information
exchange.’’ Id. at 1.
Under the heading ‘‘Reduce the Tax Gap and Make Re-
forms,’’ the analytical perspectives for the 2014 budget briefly
describes a budget proposal that would provide the secretary of
the Treasury authority to ‘‘prescribe regulations that would
require reporting of information with respect to nonresident
alien individuals, entities that are not U.S. persons, and certain
U.S. entities held in substantial part by non-U.S. owners,
including information regarding account balances and pay-
ments made with respect to accounts held by such persons and
entities.’’ OMB, supra note 41, at 202. The proposal notes that
reciprocal exchange of information ‘‘similar’’ to that required
from FFIs under FATCA would improve intergovernmental
cooperation on FATCA enforcement. Id.




(citing complaints by U.S. information exchange partner states
that beneficial ownership information is not available for LLCs
in several states, including Delaware).
47See, e.g., EU Commission, ‘‘An Action Plan to Strengthen
the Fight Against Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion,’’ COM (2012) 772
final, at 9 (Dec. 6, 2012) (in an effort to avoid proliferation of
diverse reporting requirements, this document urges the OECD
to adopt reporting forms and software developed for imple-
menting the EU savings directive).
48For further discussion, see Itai Grinberg, ‘‘Taxing Capital
Income in Emerging Countries: Will FATCA Open the Door?’’ 5
World Tax J. 325-367 (2013).
49As of January 22, 2014. For a current list of IGAs, see
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/
pages/fatca-archive.aspx.
50See JCT, ‘‘Estimated Revenue Effects of the Revenue Provi-
sions Contained in Senate Amendment 3310, The ‘Hiring Incen-
tives to Restore Employment Act,’ Under Consideration by the
Senate,’’ JCX-5-10 (Feb. 23, 2010).
51The OECD Global Forum peer review process continues to
judge countries’ tax transparency according to the standard of
information exchange on request, but the OECD strongly sup-
ports automatic information exchange. For the OECD’s recent
work on automatic information exchange, see OECD Report for
the G-8 Summit by Lough Erne, ‘‘A Step Change in Tax
Transparency’’ (2013), at 4 (describing a ‘‘step change in inter-
national tax transparency driven by developments around the
globe, including in the United States and Europe, with unprec-
edented political support for automatic exchange of informa-
tion’’). Likewise, the EU Commission, referring to the savings
directive, described the EU as ‘‘the long-time pioneer of auto-
matic exchange of information internationally.’’ EU Commis-
sion, ‘‘Automatic Exchange of Information: Frequently Asked
Questions’’ (June 12, 2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-13-533_en.htm.
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outraged reactions to FATCA among private parties
and government officials seem to be shifting to
acquiescence by the FFIs, and at least some govern-
ment officials view FATCA as an opportunity to




In recent years, the public has become increas-
ingly aware of the compensation arrangement
known as carried interest, which permits private
equity fund managers to pay tax at obscenely low
rates on obscenely high earnings for their work.1
The publicity has led Congress to consider no fewer
than eight separate pieces of legislation since 2007
to increase the tax on carried interest.2 Much of the
energy behind this movement seems to be
grounded in a concern that the current tax system
allows the superrich to gain an advantage that is
unavailable to anyone else. However, that is not
entirely accurate. For years, huge numbers of ordi-
nary self-employed people have been able to limit
the tax on their earnings when they conduct their
business through a formal business entity instead of
1E.g., Jenny Anderson and Andrew Ross Sorkin, ‘‘Congress
Weighs End to Private Equity Tax Break,’’ The New York Times,
June 21, 2007.
2For a concise summary of these legislative measures, see
James B. Sowell, ‘‘Carried Interest: Line Drawing and Fairness
(or Lack Thereof),’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 11, 2013, p. 617; Sowell,
‘‘Carried Interest: Line Drawing and Fairness (or Lack Thereof),
Part 2,’’ Tax Notes, Nov. 18, 2013, p. 721; and Sowell, ‘‘Carried
Interest: Line Drawing and Fairness (or Lack Thereof), Part 3,’’
Tax Notes, Nov. 25, 2013, p. 857.
Richard Winchester is an associate professor at
Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
In this article, Winchester explains how the tax
rules permit a self-employed individual to limit the
tax on his earnings. He also assesses the merits of a
proposal to address the situation.
This article was presented on January 17 at a
symposium in Malibu, Calif., sponsored by Pepper-
dine University School of Law and Tax Analysts.
Twenty of the nation’s leading tax academics, prac-
titioners, and journalists gathered to discuss the
prospects for tax reform as it is affected by two
crises facing Washington: dangerously misaligned
spending and tax policies, resulting in a crippling
$17.4 trillion national debt; and the IRS’s alleged
targeting of conservative political organizations. A









ll rights reserved. T
ax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
